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What roles or functions does consciousness fulfill in the making of moral decisions? Will 
artificial agents capable of making appropriate decisions in morally charged situations require 
machine consciousness? Should the capacity to make moral decisions be considered an attribute 
essential for being designated a fully conscious agent? Research on the prospects for developing 
machines capable of making moral decisions and research on machine consciousness have 
developed as independent fields of inquiry. Yet there is significant overlap. Both fields are likely 
to progress through the instantiation of systems with artificial general intelligence (AGI). 
Certainly special classes of moral decision making will require attributes of consciousness such 
as being able to empathize with the pain and suffering of others. But in this article we will 
propose that consciousness also plays a functional role in making most if not all moral decisions. 
Work by the authors of this article with LIDA, a computational and conceptual model of human 
cognition, will help illustrate how consciousness can be understood to serve a very broad role in 
the making of all decisions including moral decisions.
Keywords: Consciousness; ethics; moral decision making; artificial moral agents; LIDA; 
artificial general intelligence; moral psychology.
Safe, appropriate, and socially condoned responses to morally significant situations can often be 
programmed into artificial agents. But when confronted with more complex challenges, 
autonomous systems will require higher-order capabilities in order to select a course of action 
that will minimize harm and maximize sensitivity to moral considerations. The higher-order 
capabilities drawn upon will differ from situation to situation. This article will explore when 
consciousness will be required for machines to arrive at safe, morally appropriate, praiseworthy 
actions.
The advent of increasingly autonomous systems capable of initiating actions that cause harm to 
humans and other agents worthy of moral consideration, has given rise to a new field of inquiry 
variously known as machine ethics (ME), machine morality, artificial morality, computational 
ethics, robot ethics, and friendly AI. The initial goals of ME are practical, not theoretical. 
Machine morality extends the traditional engineering concern with safety to domains where the 
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machines themselves will need to explicitly make moral decisions. When designers and 
engineers can no longer predict what a system will do as it encounters new situations and new 
inputs, mechanisms will be required that facilitate the agent's evaluating whether available 
courses of action are safe, appropriate, and societally or morally acceptable. A system that can 
make such evaluations is functionally moral [Wallach and Allen, 2009].
The prospect for developing machines that make moral decisions (\moral machines") has 
stimulated interest in whether theories such as utilitarianism, Kant's categorical imperative, and 
even Asimov's Laws for Robots might be instantiated computationally. Investigation of strategies 
for building artificial moral agents (AMAs) has also underscored limitations in the way both 
philosophers and cognitive scientists approach and understand human moral behavior. 
Assembling a moral machine from the bottom-up draws attention to a broad array of mechanisms 
that contribute to the selection of safe, praiseworthy actions. Theoretical research on ME together 
with recent empirical research on moral psychology by cognitive scientists suggests a need for 
richer more comprehensive models of moral decision making than presently exist [Wallach and 
Allen, 2009; Wallach, 2010].
Gips [1991] and Allen et al. [2000] introduced two broad approaches for developing artificial 
agents capable of making moral decisions — the top-down implementation of a theory of ethics 
or a bottom-up process (inspired by evolutionary psychology and research on moral 
development) through which the agent explores courses of actions, is rewarded for behavior that 
is worthy of praise, and learns. In mapping the prospects for engineering AMAs, Allen, Smit, and 
Wallach [Allen et al., 2006; Wallach et al., 2008; Wallach and Allen, 2009] elucidated limitations 
inherent in top-down and bottom-up approaches. They propose that hybrids of both may be 
necessary for developing sophisticated moral machines. They also note that the capacity to 
reason about morally relevant information will not be the only capability that AMAs will require 
in order to arrive at appropriate or laudable courses of action in response to the many types of 
challenges they are likely to confront. These “suprarational” capabilities and social mechanisms 
include emotions, a theory of mind, sociability, empathy, an understanding of the semantic 
content of symbols, an embodied relationship with the environment, and consciousness. 
Additional capabilities might be added to this list. In other words, moral decisions are seldom the 
result of just one or two dedicated mechanisms. An array of mechanisms, including those used 
for general cognitive processes, contribute to determining behavioral responses to ethical 
challenges.
The moral demands on artificial agents that operate within constrained domains are bounded 
[Wallach, 2004], and therefore will not require all, or perhaps any, of these suprarational 
capabilities and social mechanisms. Nor will every context require that AMAs emulate the 
cognitive faculties that humans use to arrive at morally acceptable actions and behavior. But 
AMAs that interact with humans in social contexts will need to draw upon an array of 
suprarational capabilities and mechanisms.
The separate fields of research directed at implementing within AI each of these suprarational 
faculties are proceeding at their own pace. None of these research trajectories (e.g., affective 
computing, social robotics, or machine consciousness) are explicitly concerned with building 
AMAs. Within the field of ME, however, there are many questions as to how moral decisions 
page 2
will be made by artificial agents with or without emotions, physical embodiment, a theory of 
mind, an appreciation for social interactions and local customs, or consciousness. How limited or 
successful, for example, will machines without consciousness be at arriving at morally 
acceptable courses of action?
Computer scientists pursuing machine consciousness (MC) and artificial general intelligence 
(AGI) [Wang et al., 2008] have come to appreciate that consciousness itself and general decision 
making require the integration of input from many sources. The models of cognition they have 
begun developing accommodate a broad array of inputs and processes. The modular construction 
of these models means that additional capabilities can be added as needed. How well these 
modules can be integrated and how effectively such systems can be scaled to navigate complex 
environments will only be discovered in the process of instantiating the models.
Moral decisions will arguably be among the more difficult challenges AGI systems will need to 
master. Rather than reinventing the wheel, Wallach and Allen considered whether existing AGI 
models might be adapted to build AMAs. How might the top-down and bottom-up approaches 
for designing AMAs fit into the AGI models other scientists were developing? Suprarational 
capabilities and social mechanisms that AMAs will draw upon are also likely to be essential for 
other tasks systems with AGI will confront. Which suprarational capabilities had already been 
accommodated, at least conceptually, within computational models for general intelligence?
As a first step in exploring how a comprehensive model of human cognition might be adapted to 
make moral decisions, Wallach and Allen teamed with Franklin [Wallach and Allen, 2009; 
Wallach et al., 2010]. Their joint work with LIDA, the computational and conceptual model of 
cognition developed by Franklin and his colleagues [Franklin and Patterson, 2006; Ramamurthy 
et al., 2006; Baars and Franklin, 2007] provides a secondary benefit for studying the relationship 
between ME and MC. LIDA, and its precursor IDA, are computational and conceptual 
implementations of Baars' Global Workspace Theory [1988]. In earlier work, Franklin 
demonstrated how IDA provides a glimpse into a functional role for consciousness in the making 
of decisions [2003]. The collaboration with Wallach and Allen extended this thesis to a special 
class of decisions, moral decisions. Together they outlined a comprehensive approach for making 
moral decisions that uses the same cognitive processes used for making general decisions. That 
is, moral cognition is supported by domain general cognitive processes, even while some special 
classes of moral decisions may require additional mechanisms.
In this article we focus upon the functional role of consciousness in the making of moral 
decisions. While it might be presumed that consciousness is a prerequisite for agents making 
moral decisions when confronted with complex dilemmas, the exact role(s) consciousness plays 
has never been fully clarified. We will address four questions:
(a) What is the relationship between an agent being conscious and an agent having a capacity to 
make moral decisions?
(b) Is consciousness (weak or strong?) essential for an agent to make moral decisions?
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(c) What cognitive/computational mechanisms serve both consciousness and moral decision 
making?
(d) Should the capacity to make moral decisions be considered an attribute essential for being 
designated a fully conscious agent?
2. Consciousness and Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Moral Judgments
Thought experiments regarding the capabilities a non-human entity would require to be a moral 
agent have long been a staple for philosophers. Legal theorists have also re°ected upon the 
criteria for granting rights and/or responsibilities to non-human agents, infants, and the mentally 
impaired. Indeed, this discussion is foundational for arguments by animal rights advocates that 
some non-human animals, such as great apes, should be granted certain rights as moral patients, 
entities toward whom we have moral obligations [Singer, 1977; Regan, 1983].
The foreseeable prospect of artificial agents with abilities that are comparable to and may exceed 
those of humans, is prompting serious re°ection on criteria for attributing moral agency and 
granting legal personhood [Calverley, 2005; Chopra and White, 2011]. Legal theorists have 
argued that since non-biological entities such as corporations are legal”persons", there is, at least 
in a theoretical sense, nothing in the law that would prohibit this designation for a non-biological 
agent. Calverley [2005] specifically discusses legal personhood for non-biological systems that 
are shown to have mental states and other attributes of consciousness.
Steve Torrance has taken the lead in analyzing the relationship between consciousness and ethics 
in the context of future artificial agents with human-like abilities. Torrance focuses on whether 
artificial agents can be considered either moral patients or, what he calls,”ethical 
ʻproducers' (beings who may have moral obligations and responsibilities themselves)” [Torrance, 
2008, p. 499]. Torrance outlines an”organic view” in which — in contrast to non-human animals 
which might have rights as moral patients — artificial agents (non-biological) which lack 
sentience or phenomenal awareness would not be”genuine subjects of either moral concern or 
moral appraisal” [Torrance, 2008, p. 503]. According to Torrance,”only biological organisms 
have the ability to be genuinely sentient or conscious” [Torrance, 2008, p. 503], a claim he bases 
on the notion that,”moral thinking, feeling and action arises organically out of the biological 
history of the human species and perhaps many more primitive species” [Torrance, 2008, p. 502].
Although it is not his focus, Torrance acknowledges that the kinds of capacities mentioned as 
criteria for designating something as a moral producer might be elements of a theory of moral 
decision making. The capabilities associated with consciousness that he is most concerned with 
are the ability to feel pleasure and pain that are central for empathy. He argues that, artificial 
humanoids”are unlikely to possess sentience and hence will fail to be able to exercise the kind of 
empathic rationality that is a prerequisite for being a moral agent” [Torrance, 2008, p. 495].
Our focus is not upon whether an artificial agent should be granted moral status, but we agree 
that the organic view is worthy of serious consideration. However, the possibility of developing 
synthetic emotions, including pleasure and pain, for artificial (non-biological) agents has been of 
interest to scientists working in the fields of affective computing and machine consciousness 
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[Picard, 1997; Franklin and Patterson, 2006; Vallverdú and Casacuberta, 2008; Haikonen, 2009]. 
It is rather early to evaluate whether existing or future implementations of synthetic emotions 
will or will not lead to the kind of rich emotional intelligence that might be expected of moral 
agents. Artificial agents incapable of feeling pain or pleasure or lacking empathy may fail in 
adequately responding to certain kinds (classes) of moral challenges. But the capacity to 
empathize is not a prerequisite for responding appropriately to all moral challenges.
Much of the discourse in moral philosophy and in practical ethics would suggest that only 
decisions about intractable social and personal challenges or decisions in which self-centered 
interests are transcended for the good of others should be designated moral decisions. In our 
view moral decision making encompasses a much broader range of choices and actions. Any 
choice in°uenced by consideration for their effects on others is a moral choice. Given that these 
kinds of value judgments are implicated in most choices where information is incomplete or of 
questionable accuracy, or where the consequences of possible courses of action cannot be known 
in advance, a broad range of choices arguably have moral dimensions.
In recent years there has been considerable research demonstrating that much of moral behavior 
arises from unconscious judgments. Such research does not rule out conscious deliberation; 
rather it argues that re°ection is less common than may be otherwise presumed. The social 
intuitionist model [Haidt, 2001; Haidt and Bjorklund, 2008; Haidt and Joseph, 2007], for 
example, is generally understood as positing the primacy of emotionally activated intuitions over 
conscious reasoning as the determinant of most moral behavior. Indeed, the model of a rational 
agent, and therefore a rational moral actor, has been under assault for more than fifty years 
[Simon, 1955; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Greenwald and Banaji, 1995]. In regards to moral 
judgments, psychologists and social psychologist have demonstrated experimentally that moral 
behavior can be altered by priming, by relatively minor changes in the situation, and by 
additional unconscious or non-conscious in°uences [Isen and Levin, 1972; Darley and Batson, 
1973; Haney et al., 1973; Hassin et al., 2006]. But there have also been attempts to re-establish 
the centrality of reasoning in the making of moral decisions and the role re°ection plays in 
honing unconscious in°uences on moral judgments [Paxton and Greene, 2010].
Moral philosophers have long held that the ought of ethics is not determined by the is of moral 
psychology, and certainly not by the unconscious in°uences on moral psychology. But designing 
or teaching artificial agents to act safely and appropriately may depend on modeling a capacity 
for reasoned re°ection upon what is known about human psychology. How does one put all this 
together in an agent? How does one combine bottom-up, reactive psychological processes with 
top-down, deliberative reasoning?
Building upon the LIDA model of cognition, Wallach et al. [2010] provide a first example of 
how the top-down analysis and bottom-up psychology might be integrated. This model, in 
principle, could also accommodate additional suprarational capabilities necessary for making 
moral decisions in specific domains. For the purposes of this paper, however, we direct our 
attention to the expanded role for consciousness in the making of moral decisions suggested by 
the model. We will propose that consciousness plays a functional role in the capacity to make all 
complex decisions, particularly moral decisions. But before discussing this, let us first introduce 
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in a very cursory manner the LIDA model of cognition1 and Global Workspace Theory, which 
LIDA tries to capture computationally.
3. GWT and LIDA
Bernard Baars' Global Workspace Theory (GWT) [1988] is widely recognized as a high-level 
theory of the role of consciousness in human cognitive processing with significant support from 
empirical studies [Baars, 2002]. Three different research teams led by Stanislas Dehaene 
[Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Gaillard et al., 2009], Murray Shanahan [2006], and Stan 
Franklin have developed computational models that instantiate aspects of GWT. LIDA, the 
model we single out for discussion in this paper, was developed by Franklin and colleagues with 
input from Baars. LIDA provides a particularly useful model to illustrate a role for consciousness 
in the making of moral decisions. However, we are not suggesting that LIDA is the only AGI 
system capable of modeling human-level intelligence. LIDA has many features that are similar to 
those in other AGI models of cognition.
GWT is a neuropsychological model of consciousness that views the nervous system as a 
distributed parallel system incorporating many different specialized processes. Various coalitions 
of these specialized processes facilitate making sense of the sensory data currently coming in 
from the environment. Other coalitions sort through the results of this initial processing and pick 
out items requiring further attention. In the competition for attention a winner emerges and 
occupies what Baars calls the global workspace, the winning contents of which are presumed to 
be at least functionally conscious. The presence of a predator, enemy, or imminent danger should 
be expected, for example, to win the competition for attention. However, an unexpected loud 
noise might well usurp consciousness momentarily even in one of these situations. The contents 
of the workspace are broadcast to processes throughout the nervous system in order to recruit an 
action or response to this salient aspect of the current situation. The contents of this global 
broadcast enable each of several modes of learning.
LIDA is a computational agent that continually tries to make sense of its environment and 
determines what to do next. In LIDA this dynamic is represented through a model that describes 
how unconscious mechanisms feed the conscious processing of information. LIDA implements 
GWT as a cascading sequence of cognitive cycles (see Fig. 1).
During a cognitive cycle the agent constantly samples (senses) its external and internal 
environment. This sensory information is matched to information within various memory 
systems in a process of discerning the features (objects, categories, relations, events, situations, 
etc.) of the present situation.
Fig. 1. The LIDA cognitive cycle.
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1 LIDA is a very extensive model of cognition, whose development is covered in more than fifty 
published articles. Many of the articles focus upon facets of LIDA. The most comprehensive 
description of decision making in LIDA is contained in Wallach et al. [2010] upon which this 
paper builds. 
In each cognitive cycle, attention codelets search this unconscious model of the present situation 
for specific features or percepts. Thousands of these codelets could be searching specifically for 
morally relevant considerations. Those that find information germane to their directive or 
function will join in coalitions with other attention codelets that have found related information. 
These coalitions occupy the global workspace and vie for attention. In each cycle there is a 
winning coalition whose contents are made conscious by being broadcast throughout the system. 
The broadcast is directed in particular at procedural memory in pursuit of an action in response 
to the information requiring attention. Franklin hypothesizes that there are 5–10 cycles each 
second [Madl et al., in press]. In each of these 5–10 cycles there is a broadcast and the selection 
of an action in response.
One might, for example, presume that while driving a car focusing upon the road conditions wins 
the competition for attention in many cycles, but once the response (or lack of a need for any 
change) has been determined, the”check the road” coalition will be weaker than other coalitions 
during a number of intermediary cycles. Attention can now be devoted to listening to the radio 
during intermediary cycles.
In LIDA a distinction is made between the conscious mediation of the contents of the global 
workspace leading to the activation of an unconsciously chosen response, and the conscious 
process of volitional decision making. Generally the former is said to occur in one cognitive 
cycle, while the latter will require multiple cycles.
4. Moral Judgments and Moral Decisions
Usually decision making is thought of as a deliberative process that entails reasoning, planning, 
problem solving, and meta-cognition. But action selection can also occur through consciously 
mediated emotionally activated intuitions and automatized learned behavior. We follow Haidt's 
nomenclature by referring to emotionally activated intuitions or the unconscious selection of 
consciously mediated actions as judgments. Judgments do not necessarily express social norms 
and may even be prejudices, such as a rejection of those who do not belong to one's group. While 
there is no deliberation or volitional decision making in judgments, future judgments can be 
altered through experience. Baars has proposed that attention is sufficient for learning and thus 
learning occurs with each conscious broadcast [1988]. Several modes of such learning have been 
included in the LIDA model [Franklin and Patterson, 2006]. The bottom-up propensities 
embodied in emotional/affective responses to actions and their outcomes can also be modified by 
ex post facto re°ection. In other words, there is an ongoing process where consciously mediated 
behavior is molded and honed by experience and deliberation. Given this dynamic relationship 
between judgments and deliberations, the moral decision-making system of an agent can be said 
to include both.
A strength of LIDA lies in the model's ability to accommodate the messiness and complexity of a 
hybrid approach to decision making. Moral decisions are particularly messy, drawing upon 
emotions, moral sentiments, intuitions, heuristics, rules and duties, principles, and even some 
explicit valuation of utility or expected outcomes. In analyzing how a moral decision-making 
system that includes both judgments and deliberation might be implemented in LIDA, Wallach et 
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al. [2010] addressed six questions, whose answers we very brie°y summarize here.2 In answering 
these questions it was not our intent to explain how a particular theory of ethics would be 
implemented in LIDA. Rather, we wish to provide tentative explanations of general processes 
central to moral judgments and volitional decision making.
(1) Where are bottom-up propensities and values implemented? How does the agent learn new 
values and propensities, as well as reinforce or defuse existing values and propensities?
Objects, people, contexts, events, situations, and other percepts are represented as nodes within 
the perceptual memory of LIDA. Associations between these percepts and valenced feelings 
(either negative or positive) are the primary means of capturing values within the agent's mind 
[Franklin and Patterson, 2006]. These values often represent propensities that have been 
evolutionarily acquired and then shaped by experience.
Affects and perceptions that arise within one LIDA cycle automatically form associations, which 
will decay over time, but can also be strengthened or weakened by sustained sensory input and 
attention. As we mentioned earlier, Baars posits that each instance of attention contributes toward 
learning. By reinforcing links in an association, sustained or conscious attention produces 
learning and can build longterm memory.
A particularly difficult challenge for all human-like computer architectures is how the system 
generates or acquires totally new nodes. There is also the difficult problem of how valenced 
feelings will be represented. A cognitive representation of feelings may not adequately express 
the richness of content and meaning that we associate with somatic feelings.
(2) How does the LIDA model transition from a single cycle to the determination that 
information in consciousness needs to be deliberated upon?
Generally, when the situation is either new or appears to be novel, a multicycled process of 
deliberation will naturally arise because LIDA is unlikely during a single cycle to determine an 
appropriate response. In effect, new or apparently new situations that do not fit neatly into 
learned heuristics demand attention over time.
(3) How are rules or duties represented in the LIDA model? What activates a rule and brings it to 
conscious attention? How might some rules be automatized to form unconscious rules-of-thumb 
(heuristics)? 
186! W. Wallach, C. Allen & S. Franklin
Deliberation in LIDA is modeled upon William James theory of”volitional” decision making. 
James viewed decisions as a negotiation between internal proposers of courses of action, 
objectors, and supporters. In LIDA proposed courses of action that win the competition for 
consciousness will impel the initiation of an action stream that will continue to be reviewed in 
page 8
2 Chapter 11 of Moral Machines: Teaching Robotics Right from Wrong [Wallach and Allen, 
2009] provides a fuller discussion, along with examples, of the answers to these questions. The 
fullest discussion of the answers can be found in Wallach et al. [2010].
subsequent cycles. This action stream could activate a rule or duty, stored in semantic memory, 
which objects to the proposed action, and in a subsequent cycle wins the competition for 
attention. Thus begins a multicycled process in which proposer, objector, and supporter codelets 
successively win the competition for attention. Pertinent memories and other associated 
information also enter the mix, including additional rules or duties and relevant exceptions.
The activation of proposals and objections decays in each subsequent cycle. But strong 
constraints, such as not killing, can have high levels of activation through reinforced connections 
to feelings such as shame or fear. Thus strong constraints are not easily over-ridden. While this 
kind of process is compatible with a battle of urges that might not be considered a deliberation, 
when the competing elements correspond to reasons then we believe this is an implementation of 
a deliberation.
On each occasion when a rule or duty comes to attention it is a subject for learning and 
modification. For rules that arise in similar situations, or for situations that required sustained 
deliberation, LIDA will produce a new node in perceptual memory, that might represent a new 
variation of the rule. If encountered often enough, a response to a challenge for which there is no 
objection can be captured within procedural memory as an habituated response and activated in 
just one cognitive cycle. But before this kind of procedural learning can occur, the action must 
have been selected at least once after a deliberative process. Deliberation can produce habitual 
behaviors.
(4) How can we implement planning or imagination (the testing out of different scenarios) in 
LIDA?
Imaginative planning or testing of various possible scenarios in LIDA is comparable to building 
a model in the workspace of the current situation by linking nodes from perceptual and/or 
episodic memory. The consciously proposed action at the completion of each model or scenario 
will or will not cue objections indicating the success or issues with the model. In the following 
cycle, the action selected in response to an objection could be as simple as making a minor 
alteration or adding a component to the model.
(5) What determines the end of a deliberation?
The deliberative dialogue continues until there is no objection to a proposed action or until the 
metaphorical timer requiring some action rings. The decay of objections in succeeding cycles 
means that strongly reinforced proposals will win out over weak objections. Strong objections 
will prevail over weak proposals. However, time pressures can force a decision before all 
objections have been dispelled.
The selected course of action may in retrospect fail to satisfy prevailing exterior norms. LIDA-
inspired moral agents are not designed around fixed moral rules, values, or principles. Therefore 
they, like human agents, are prone to acting upon strong impulses without necessarily taking into 
consideration the needs of others. Developing a LIDA agent with the kind of rich sensitivity to 
moral considerations and how each consideration might be comparatively weighted will require 
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much experience and learning, just as it does with teaching a young adult to be morally sensitive 
and considerate.
(6) When a resolution to the challenge has been determined, how might LIDA monitor whether 
that resolution is successful? How can LIDA use this monitoring for further learning?
Monitoring actions is central for moral development. Once a resolution has been reached and an 
action selected, LIDA generates an expectation codelet, an attention codelet that brings to 
attention the outcome of an action. An expectation codelet would bring to the global workspace 
any discrepancy between the actual results of an action and the predicted results. Any 
discrepancy would contribute to procedural learning inhibiting or reinforcing the application of 
that procedure to future similar challenges. For a decision that entailed moral considerations, 
such procedural learning would foster moral development through expectations in regard to the 
positive or negative moral outcome of actions.
4.1. The advantage of codelets
Attention codelets sensitive to morally relevant information would need to be designed for 
LIDA to engage in moral deliberations. It is unclear at this time whether the design of such 
codelets would differ significantly from the design of codelets that search for concrete 
information. We expect that attention codelets sensitive to facial and vocal expressions would be 
among those gathering information relevant to moral deliberations.
An advantage of codelets is that they provide an extensible framework through which more and 
more relevant considerations can be found within the model of the situation. No one needs to 
specify in advance the considerations in°uencing the situation or the criteria for evaluating a 
scenario. Therefore, codelets provide a particularly useful approach for representing the 
messiness of so many moral challenges.
5. Evolution, Moral Decisions and Consciousness
Certainly artificial agents that lack consciousness can make moral decisions in many situations 
by applying normative rules to the information at hand. But in our analysis consciousness 
becomes much more central for agents operating within complex environments. These agents 
will perform many tasks related to the making of moral decisions in addition to applying norms, 
rules, or moral principles. AMAs will also need to recognize when they are in an ethically 
significant situation, to have sensitivity to the array of moral considerations that impinge upon 
that decision, to discriminate essential from inessential information, to estimate the sufficiency of 
initial information and search for additional information when needed, and to make judgments 
about the intentionality of the other agents with whom it is interacting. All of this must be done 
within the time available to take action.
An array of sensors, subsystems, and processes will be enlisted to perform these tasks. These are 
largely the same cognitive mechanisms used for general decision making. Moral cognition is 
supported by domain general processes, many of which will also be needed for machine 
consciousness. So how closely entangled are the fields of machine ethics and machine 
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consciousness? Should we consider the capacity to make moral decisions an attribute essential to 
consciousness?
Scholars point to evidence of proto-morality [Katz, 2000; de Waal, 2006; Bekoff and Pierce, 
2009] and pre-re°ective consciousness [Seth et al., 2005; Panksepp, 2005; Edelman and Seth, 
2009] in many non-human species. The evolution of consciousness and the evolution of morality 
are each developing as sub-disciplines in their own right. Wallach [2005] hypothesized that 
consciousness and moral decision making coevolved. The basic argument is that one fitness 
function of consciousness lay in how it facilitated the making of decisions in ambiguous 
situations where neither of two or more instinctual or already learned action sequences 
(automatized responses) was activated. Consider the distant presence of a potentially threatening 
natural enemy that does not immediately activate a fight or °ight response. Such situations can 
lead to sustained attention (proto-re°ection) during which existing action sequences are altered or 
new action sequences are created. The latter might entail the recognition by a mammalian or 
earlier ancestor that under certain circumstances a natural enemy is non-threatening, for example, 
the predator is satiated or ready for a nap. The observing agents can thus conserve energy and is 
free to return to other tasks such as feeding the young, while continuing to periodically check 
whether her enemy is taking a more threatening stance. This requires a moral decision in the 
sense that some form of”valuing” would come into responding to the challenge. In other words, 
under circumstances where information is unclear or incomplete sustained attention (proto-re
°ection) leads to a kind of valuing of information that alters existing behavioral patterns, but 
more importantly, can even create new behavior streams.
If Wallach is correct, then central among the fitness functions served by consciousness is the 
manner in which it facilitates a kind of valuing that fostered making decisions when the available 
information is ambiguous, confusing, contradictory, or incomplete. Given that such situations are 
common, this kind of valuing opened up an array of new possibilities.
Even if one holds that the evolution of consciousness, decision making, and moral decision 
making are entangled, there are practical reasons for distinguishing between the project of 
designing AMAs and exploring ways to implement consciousness in machines. However, we 
should not lose sight of how both projects will progress with the emulation of the same cognitive 
processes utilizing many of the same cognitive mechanisms. Furthermore, we should not 
overlook evolutionary strategies that further the interactive development of MC and the design of 
AMAs.
6. Conscious Artificial Moral Agents
Our discussion of the LIDA model of cognition illustrates a functional role for consciousness in 
the making of all decisions, including moral decisions. However, neither LIDA nor any other 
AGI has been fully implemented. Therefore, it is impossible to know whether such systems can 
adequately be scaled to manage the on-going sorting through sensory information, action 
selection, scenario building, and deliberation necessary to operate successfully in complex 
environments filled with other agents. In the process of building models of AGI, designers and 
engineers will recognize the need for additional subsystems to support capabilities whose 
contribution may have not yet been recognized. The value of models such as LIDA is that they 
page 11
offer an architecture that in theory can integrate a vast array of inputs into an approach for 
discerning salient information, for selecting appropriate actions, and for rich deliberation. 
Competition for consciousness between different coalitions, global broadcasting of the winning 
coalition, and the selection of an action in each cycle are the mechanisms used in the LIDA 
model to integrate input from various sources.
While we cannot know for sure that LIDA-like agents will accommodate a broad array of moral 
considerations in choices and actions, the multicyclical approach to higher-order cognition, the 
increasing speed of computers and therefore the speed of individual cycles, and the unconscious 
parallel processing of information all suggest that this is a promising path to explore in the 
development of sophisticated AMAs.
We do not know how far this strategy will progress. Nor do we know how broad an array of 
ethical challenges can be managed successfully within the functional model of consciousness 
suggested by GWT and LIDA. A further challenge concerns the necessity for some form of 
phenomenal experience that might not be captured in the GWT/LIDA model. Phenomenal 
consciousness is difficult to measure in any agent. But if, as Torrance notes in his explication of 
the organic view, phenomenal awareness is foundational for empathetic rationality, then evidence 
that an agent is sensitive to what others feel, might be counted as evidence the agent is 
phenomenally conscious. However, if the organic view is correct and only biological entities can 
be moral agents, silicon-based artificial agents will never progress beyond a kind of deductive 
empathy.
In this article, we explored the relationship between consciousness and moral decision making 
within one model capable of implementing both. Given this implementation, we propose the 
following:
(1) Consciousness serves most if not all moral decision making as it serves decision making 
more generally. Consciousness will be especially important for making volitional moral 
decisions.
(2) Moral cognition is supported by domain general cognitive processes. (3) Among the 
mechanisms that serve both moral decision making and consciousness are those which integrate 
perception and action over multiple cycles, including inner modeling of the relationship between 
the agent and its environment for generating expectations of events and assessing the 
consequences of various courses of action.
Machine consciousness and designing artificial moral agents are two projects that are joined at 
the hip. Although we have not argued for it directly, we further propose that the capacity to make 
moral decisions be considered an attribute essential for being designated a fully conscious agent. 
Thus, a fully conscious machine or an AGI system worthy of being considered a full moral agent 
would be an artificial conscious moral agent.
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